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with him.I. Introduction
In German post-war historiography, the 1960s are usually viewed as
a time of political and economic transition. Politically, the pe-
riod marks the watershed between the paternalistic conservatism of
the Adenauer era and the full-scale social democracy of the early
seventies, with the so-called 'grand coalition' government of the
late sixties being the tangible incarnation of transition. Econom-
ically, the period figures as a bridge between the German miracle
of the fifties and the slow-down and stagnation of the seventies
and eighties, with national income growing at a rate which was
still remarkably high by historical standards, but not more than
average by the international standards of the time. In one re-
spect, however, the 1960s do unambiguously figure as a peak of
German history after World War II and even in this century, namely
in terms of labour shortage.
If, for the moment, we take a state of labour shortage or overem-
ployment to mean a jobless rate of less than or equal to 1.5 '/.,
then the time span from 1960 to 1973 is the only one in the German
history of this century which qualifies as a prolonged period of
overemployment, briefly interrupted only by the short and sharp
recession of 1967, when the unemployment rate temporarily rose
above 2 '/.. No other peacetime period of- this century comes close
to this record: Before World War I a state of virtually permanent
full employment prevailed, with an unemployment rate of about
2.5 '/. on average; still then, a casual glance over the (admit-
tedly sketchy) statistics of the late 'Kaiserreich* is sufficient
to show that the labour shortage of that time did not reach any
2)
such dramatic dimensions as in the 1960s. The years of the Wei-
mar Republic after the currency reform in 1923 and the Nazi period
until 1936 were times of chronic unemployment, with the jobless
rate not falling below 8 */. except for a very short boom in 1925,
when it touched 6.7 •/,. The 1950s were a period of rapid and
sustained reduction of unemployment from a level of 10.2 */. in 1950
down to 3.4 '/, in 1957 and 2.4 */. in 1959, levels which may be
called full, but not yet overemployment. And the 1970s and, evenmore so, the 1980s have been periods of chronic unemployment, just
like the time of the Weimar Republic.
In this paper, we shall enquire into the causes and the conse-
quences of this unique experience of extreme labour shortage. In
Section II, we present a quantitative profile of the phenomenon in
question. In the remaining parts of the paper, we give a brief ac-
count of why overemployment came about (Section III) and what it
implied for growth and structural change at the time and in later
periods (Section IV). Just as the policy debate of the time, we
shall lay the emphasis on the consequences of labour shortage
rather than its causes which, at least with the benefit of hind-
sight, look fairly uncontroversial.
II. A Quantitative Profile of Overemployment in Germany 1960-73
Table 1 presents three complementary measures of the state of the
labour market in the Federal Republic of Germany, the unemploy-
ment, the vacancy and the so-called search rate.
In the relevant period 1960-1973, the unemployment rate was ex-
tremely low: in IE out of 14 years (1960-66; 1969-73) it remained
well below 1.5 'A, in nine years (1961-66; 1969-71) even below 1 V,;
in four years it reached an all-time low at 0.7 */.. As a five-year
average of three subperiods (1960-64; 1965-69; 1970-74), the unem-
ployment rate gently rose from 0.9 to 1.3 '/,, still a level which
contrasts sharply with the dimension of unemployment in earlier
and later years. Looking over the whole postwar period, one may
say that the sixties and early seventies make up the bottom of a
U-shaped curve of unemployment.
An analogous pattern emerges from the movement of the vacancy
rate: all over the period 1960-73 (except the recession year 1967)
it remained above 2 '/., reaching an all-time high in the late six-
3) ties. The respective five-year average of the vacancy rateTable 1: Aggregate Labour Market Statistics for Germany 1950 - 1986















































































































































































Notes: 2From 1950 to 1958 excluding, from 1959 to 1986 including Saarland and Berlin
..Defined as share of unemployed in labour force; annual average; in p.c.
Defined as share of vacancies in labour demand (employment and vacancies); annual average;
4in p.c.
Defined as share of persons who search for alternative employment without being unemploy-
ed, in total employment; annual average; in p.c.
Source: Bundesanstalt flir Arbeit (before 1954: Bundesministerxum filr Arbeit), Jahreszahlen zur
Arbeitsstatistik, various issuesstayed constant at 2.5 '/, in the three subperiods, way above
earlier and later levels.
The empirical picture is rounded off by the search rate which may
be viewed as an aggregate measure of discontent of the employed
with their jobs. Clearly, in times of labour shortage, one would
expect the search rate to be low: as job offers abound, it should
be comparatively easy for any worker to match his employment taste
by changing jobs without enrolling as a "job seeker" at the labour
office. Not surprisingly then, the search rate was at its lowest
(0.5-0.6 '/.) from 1958 to 1971, which by and large corresponds to
the period of low unemployment and high vacancy rates.
Given this general pattern, there is no doubt that the sixties and
early seventies have been the time of the tightest labour market
conditions in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. How-
ever, the question remains whether it was a time of full employ-
ment, with the labour market just clearing at the given real wage
level, or whether it should rather be regarded as a time of over-
employment, with labour demand being rationed by labour supply.
To answer these questions two facts stand out. Firstly, the period
1960-73 is unique in the sense that the vacancy rate surpassed the
unemployment rate (again with the exception of the recession year
1967). As we know from theoretical labour economics, the number of
unemployed and the number of vacancies depend on the optimal
search behaviour of workers and employers respectively so that,
even in labour market equilibrium, one should not expect the two
rates to be equal. Still then, the sharp and persistent level
shift of both rates in 1959/60 and 1973/7^ and the extremely high
ratio of vacancies per unemployed - about 3 to 4 in the years
1961-66 and 1969-71 - do point to some underlying regime shift
from a buyers' (or temporarily equilibrium) labour market to a
sellers' market in the late fifties and vice versa in the early
sevent ies.Secondly, the period 1960-73 is characterized by a strong influx
of foreign labour, mainly from southern Europe, the so-called
guest-workers ("Gastarbeiter"). Table 2 summarizes some aggregate
statistics on foreign labour in Germany. From 1959 onwards, the
share of foreigners in the German labour force grew from about
0.5 V. up to ^.9 '/. in 1966, and then again from a sharply reduced
level of 3.8 */• in 1967 to 9.6 '/. in 1973, the highest reached so
far; starting with the 197^-75 recession, the share gradually de-
clined to 5.7 */. in 1985, with only one slight recovery in the mod-
est boom years of the late seventies. A similar pattern emerges
from the share of foreigners in total employment which reached a
peak of 10.9 '/. in 1973. Looking separately at the absolute annual
change of employment of both Germans and foreigners, it becomes
evident that from about 1963 until 1973 the influx of foreign la-
bour was the main source of labour supply elasticity. After the
expellees from the former eastern provinces of Germany had finally
been absorbed by the labour market in the late fifties, a last
surge of new "German" employment (on balance one million new jobs)
occurred in the boom period 1959-61, when the wave of refugees
from East Germany reached its peak before the Berlin Wall was
built. After this political seizure, the supply of German surplus
labour dried up; with declining participation rates (due to an
unfavourable, war-distorted age structure) and with most other
"quiet reserves" (stille Reserven) mobilized, the German labour
supply turned inelastic and even began to shrink. Hence, the
business upswing of 1963-65 was the first one to rely mainly on
the employment of foreign labour, with almost 70 '/. of the employ-
ment expansion being due to the influx of foreigners; in the long
boom period 1969-73 when - on balance - 1.7 million new jobs were
created, this share rose to 85 '/.. Similarly, the sharp recession
of 1967 led to a net outflow of about 230,000 foreign workers
(largely due to the fact that many guest-workers did not return to
Germany in 1967 after having spent the winter at home') and virtu-
ally no net immigration in the year ahead when the labour market
still had to absorb the large number of Germans layed off during
the recession.Table 2:
Year
Foreign Labour in Germany 1955-1985
Share of Foreign Labour ^
in Total Labour Force (%)
total male female
Share of Foreign Employees
in Total Employment
Absolute Change in Employment
















































































































































































































































Note: From 1950 to 1959 excluding, from 1960 to 1985 including Saarland and Berlin
Annual average
Annual average, excluding self-employed
4
Changes of annual averages
*0wn estimates
Sources: Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Jahreszahlen zur Arbeitsstatistik, various issues; Statisti-
sches Bundesamt, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen (tape of the Institut fur Welt-
wirtschaft) and Statistisches Jahrbuch filr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.These statistics convey the picture of a German economy which was
on an overemployment growth path with no domestic labour reserves
left over for exceptional boom periods. The labour shortage led to
waves of foreign workers filling a good part, but by far not all
vacancies on offer. In the brief recession interlude of 1967, the
labour supply of foreigners served as a buffer stock which helped
to alleviate the negative impact of the labour demand shortfall on
domestic employment.
Of course, the labour shortage was not uniform across sectors of
economic activity and regions, since structural change naturally
leads to different degrees of labour scarcity. As to sectors, the
general pattern of structural change in the period 1960-73 is ap-
parent from Table 3: there was a dramatic shrinking of employment
in the primary sectors of agriculture, forestry and mining, a mod-
erate growth in manufacturing, construction, trade and transport,
and a rapid growthydn most branches of services, including the
government sector. Compared to the time after 1973, two facts are
worth noting: firstly, the rapid shrinking of agriculture and min-
ing and, in the same vein, the rapid growth of services; secondly,
the moderate but still significant growth of manufacturing and
construction, which is unusual for a highly industrialized country
like Germany in the sixties. To get a clue to these peculiar fea-
tures, it is important to sort out the sectoral change of guest-
workers' employment in the relevant period: Table k shows that,
on balance, about 80 '/. of all foreign labour (about 1 . A- million
people) moved into manufacturing and construction; in both sectors
foreigners apparently replaced Germans who switched over to ser-
vice sectors like trade, banking and insurance, and, most of all,
the government. In manufacturing, this substitution covered about
one million people in twelve years, leading to a share of
7) foreigners in total employment of almost 15 */. in 1972. This may
help to explain why employment in services, which are less open to
foreigners than manufacturing and construction due to the required
language skills and institutional barriers, drastically increased
at the expense of the primary, but not at the expense of the
secondary sector.Table 3: Average Annual Change of Employment by Sectors in the
Periods 1960-73 and 1973-86 (in p.c.)
Sector Employment Employment




























































Source: Own calculations from Statistisches Bundesamt, Volks-
wirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen














Notes: Change of level of annual average employment (excl. self-
employed) between 1961 and 1972.
2
Change of level of employment (excl. self-employed) at the
end of September between 1961 and 1972-.
Source: Own calculations from Institut fur Arbeits- und Berufsfor-
schung, Arbeitsmarktstastische Zahlen in Zeitreihenform -


























+ 954As to regions, Table 5 gives some measures of the mismatch of un-
employment (or, for that matter, labour shortage) between the nine
German state labour districts from 1950 to 1986. As is well known,
the high level of unemployment in the early fifties (1950-5**) had
a pronounced regional element, with the rural refugee-crowded
areas <Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg; Lower Saxony/ Bremen; Northern
Bavaria) being much more affected than the more urbanized and in-
dustrialized states of North-Rhine-Westfalia, Hessia and Baden-
8) Wurttemberg. (We exclude Berlin from consideration because the
city found itself in a very unfavourable economic climate due to
the political circumstances of the Cold War.) Despite the subse-
quent fall of unemployment, this pattern basically survived the
fifties: in the first half of the sixties, the rural areas had
rates of 1-1.5 '/., the urbanized states rates of O.S (!)- 0.6 '/..
Hence different degrees of labour shortage were clearly recogniz-
able at the time. From the mid-sixties on, this pattern began to
change, with Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg, Southern Bavaria and -
somewhat later - Northern Bavaria gaining and North-Rhine-West-
falia losing ground. This gradual realignment brought about a tem-
porary convergence of unemployment rates which reached a peak in
the seventies when - apart from the notoriously superior perfor-
mance of Baden-Wurttemberg - the jobless rates of all states lay
in a very narrow range (1.1-1.8 '/. in 1970-74 and 3.9-5.2 */. in
1975-79). However, as the decline of North-Rhine-Westfalia - now
joined by Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg and Lower Saxony/Bremen - and
the rise of Bavaria continued, the by now familiar north/south
imbalance of unemployment began to emerge by the early eighties.
Not surprisingly, an aggregate measure of the regional component
of unemployment (across state labour districts), the Jackman—
Index, indicates a gradual and sustained decline from the fifties
9 ) to the seventies and a rise thereafter. Hence, in comparative
static terms of regional unemployment, the sixties and early sev-
enties should be viewed as a time of convergence between rural and
industrialized regions.
Of course, in times of strong immigration, this static convergence
may conceal regional disparities in employment growth which areTable 5: Regional Mismatch of Unemployment, Germany 1950-1986*
Period** Jackman-Index Unemployment Rate (in p.c.) in State Employment District
incl. excl.



































































































Notes: * From 1950 to 1958 excluding, from 1959 to 1985 including Saarland
** All numbers given are period averages of respective annual averages
+ own estimate
1 Jackman-Index (J) defined as J = 0.5 • £ | U./U - V./V|, with
U.(V.) = number of unemployed (vacancies) in state employment district i;
U(V) = number of unemployed (vacancies) in Germany (including/excluding Berlin)
SH/HH: Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg; NS/BM: Lower Saxony/Bremen;
NRW: North-Rhine-Westfalia; HS: Hessia; RP/SA:Rheinland-Pfalz/Saarland; BW: Baden-
Wurttemberg; NBY: Northern Bavaria; SBY: Southern Bavaria; BL: Berlin
Sources: Own calculations from Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (before 1954: Bundesministerium fur
Arbeit), Arbeitsstatistik-Jahreszahlen; various issues.11
not necessarily reflected in changes of the unemployment rates.
Table 6 indicates that, in terms of employment growth, the picture
is indeed somewhat different: while as before North-Rhine-West-
falia shows a bad and Southern Bavaria a good performance, the
employment growth in Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg is well below av-
erage, even if the fast shrinking primary sector is excluded. In
general, it is quite evident from the numbers in the table, that
it was the southern industrialized regions of Hessia, Baden-WQrt-
temberg and newly rising Southern Bavaria which performed best in
terms of employment growth, no matter whether the primary sector
is included or not. These are precisely the regions which sucked
in the bulk of foreign workers: in 197S, the share of foreigners
in employment was highest in Baden-Wur ttemberg (16.7 '/.) followed
by Hessia (13.7 '/.) , Southern Bavaria (13.3 '/.) and, as a poor
fourth, highly industrialized Nor th-Rh ine-Westf al ia (10.9 */.) ; at
the end were the more rural areas of Lower Saxony/Bremen (6.0 */,) f
Sch leswig-Ho lstein/Hamburg (6.5 '/.), Northern Bavaria (7.0 '/.) and
Rhineland-Pf alz/Saar (7.1 '/.) . Apparently, the labour shortage
showed up most forcefully in the southern industrialized centers,
and the mobile guest-workers willingly moved there to fill the
emerging vacancies. In this sense, they served as a substitute for
internal migration to alleviate interregional disparities in la-
bour shortage. In fact, the statistics on intra-national migration
in Table 7 indicate that the overall level of migration declined
from the fifties to the sixties although it did not yet reach to-
day's much smaller dimension. Most visibly, the share of systemat-
ic inter-state in total inter-state migration (i.e., loosely
speaking, the share of one-way inter-state migration!) fell from
38.8 V. in the early fifties and 12.1 '/. in the late fifties down to
5.3-6.2 '/. in 1960/7*t; not before the eighties did it rise again
significantly. Hence, while the large regional disparities in the
fifties induced an extensive one-way migration from rural to urban
centers, the less dramatic regional differences of labour shortage
in the sixties were mostly handled by the flexible guest-worker
movements from abroad right into the southern industrialized cen-
ters .12
Table 6: Interregional Dispersion of Employment Growth Rates 1960-72












































































1) Average annual growth rate of employment (incl. self-
employed) 1960-72
(2) Average annual growth rate of employment (excl. self-
employed) 1960-72
Source: Own calculations from Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufs-
forschung, Arbeitsmarktstatistische Zahlen in Zeitreihenform
Jahreszahlen ftir Bundeslander und Landesarbeitsamtsbezirke -
Ausgabe 1974.







































Share of Systematic Inter-State









Notes: *From 1950 to 1958 excluding, from 1959 to 1985 includ-
ing Saarland and Berlin
**A11 numbers given are period averages of respective annual averages
(1) Number of intra-national (i.e. intra-state plus inter-state) mi-
gration cases as a percentage of the West German population
(2) Number of intra-state migration cases as a percentage of the West
German population
(3) Defined as £M./P (in p.c.), with M. being the number of immigration
cases in state i and P being the size of the German population
(4 ) Defined as 0.5- XT | M. -E. | / £ M. (in p.c), with M^. being the num-
ber of immigration and E. £he
1number of emigration cases in state i
Source: Own calculations from Statistisches Bundesamt (ed. ) ,
Wanderungen (various issues) and Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland (various issues).13
To sum up, the sixties and early seventies were a period of gener-
al labour shortage or overemployment, with foreign workers figur-
ing as the-elastic part of the aggregate labour supply in both
times of boom and bust. Structural change was accomplished by
Germans moving from the primary and secondary into the tertiary
sector, with foreign workers filling the gaps left in manufactur-
ing and construction, but not in agriculture and mining; regional
disparities were evened by foreign workers moving right to those
places, notably the southern industrialized centers, where employ-
ment opportunities opened up.
III. The Causes of Labour Shortage
Overemployment may be due to cyclical demand or secular supply
factors. In the sixties and early seventies business cycles were
powerful indeed: cyclical overheating of demand was responsible
for some particularly dramatic episodes of labour shortage in the
boom periods around I960, 1965 and 1970; conversely, the sudden
rise of unemployment in 1967 was the outcome of a temporary con-
traction of demand. However, the cyclical demand fluctuations
merely superseded an overemployment growth path which calls for an
explanation in terms of long-run trends on the supply side.
On long-run neoclassical grounds, a state of overemployment can
only persist if the marginal productivity at full employment is
and remains higher than the real wage; thereby the term "full em-
ployment" denotes a state in which the domestic (i.e., non-foreign
stock of labour) is fully utilized, with no net inflow of foreign
labour. Unfortunately, the marginal productivity of labour cannot
be measured directly; hence we have to confine ourselves to data
on average labour productivity and the wage level. Taking the time
around 1959/60 as a full employment bench-mark and disregarding
cyclical fluctuations of productivity and wages, all relevant sta-
tistics indicate that until the late sixties wages increased at
about the pace of actual average labour productivity: e.g., the
adjusted labour share (i.e., the share of wages and salaries innational income or value added corrected for shifts between self-
and dependant employment) and the contract income share (covering
both wages/salaries and a wage equivalent income of the self-em-
ployed) remained virtually constant from 1960 to 1969. This is
remarkable since the large influx of - mostly low-skilled -
guest-workers ceteris paribus pulled down the growth of (marginal
and average) productivity just as in the seventies and eighties
the sharp rise of unemployment is likely to have pushed up the
average productivity of the employed since the least productive
were laid off. Hence, until the late sixties, unions acted in col-
lective bargaining as if they had an interest in the well-being
not only of German union members, but also of potential guest-
workers. Despite the early visible indications of a labour short-
age, they did not press for real wage increases above actual pro-
ductivity growth. Thus the labour shortage of the early sixties
was simply carried over to later years, with no substantial cor-
rection of unit labour costs until the late sixties. As actual
labour productivity grew fast - in 1960-73 ^.1 */. p.a., in manufac-
turing even 5.0 % p.a. - a drastic and, in absolute terms, in-
creasing influx of foreign labour was the natural consequence. Not
before the first half of the seventies did a wage explosion set
in, which led to a definite upward correction of the labour
. IE) share.
But why did labour productivity grow so fast? To answer this ques-
tion, two facts stand out: firstly, there was plenty of scope for
realizing productivity gains from international trade in the trad-
ed goods sector, i.e., mainly in manufacturing. Exports grew very
rapidly in the period 1960-73, in real terms at a rate of 7.5 */.
p.a. compared to real domestic absorption, which increased at 3.6
'/. p.a.. In turn, the growth of exports was favoured by a series of
steps towards trade-1iberalisation within the European community
and by the apparent undervaluation of the German currency in terms
of domestic production costs which made the German trade balance
the only one of all industrialized countries that was in sizeable
surplus all over the period (in the later years joined by Japan).
Secondly, the capital stock grew very fast, too, in real terms at15
an annual rate of about 5.5 '/. p.a., in manufacturing even at 6.5 '/.
p.a. in the period 1960-73. Of course, capital stock growth is de-
termined by net investment, and net investment by profit expecta-
tions; they, in turn, depend on the price of the complementary
factors, notably labour, and the expected levels of future product
demand (accelerator principle). Apparently, there was reason for
optimism in both respects: the longer labour restrained its wage
demands, the more confident firms could be in expecting the cele-
brated social peace to continue without paying too high a price
for it in terms of wage concessions; the longer the export surge
continued, the brighter the future growth of demand looked for
German goods in a rapidly expanding world market, since the demand
for German goods seemed to be highly income elastic. Hence, capi-
tal stock growth, which was largely taken for granted at the time,
must itself be regarded as a function of the supply spurts initi-
ated by the low unit labour costs and the moves towards trade lib-
eralisation; however, it added a vigorous element of accelerator
dynamics which - with the benefit of hindsight - makes the growth
process of the time look like a self-perpetuating virtuous circle.
This virtuous circle was broken by the sudden and substantial re-
valuation of factor prices and the German currency in the early
seventies which, with expectations still fixed on experiences of
the happy past, led to a serious supply-side crises in the mid-
seventies. Whether this crisis and the onsetting slack of growth
could have been avoided or at least mitigated leads right to the
question whether the economic growth of the sixties and early sev-
enties did not already have a distorted and unhealthy shape. This
brings us to the consequences of labour shortage.
IV. The Consequences of Labour Shortage
The secular labour shortage of the sixties and early seventies had
two immediate effects: (i) it turned the domestic labour market
into a seller's market; and <ii) it induced a heavy influx of for-
eign labour. Both effects had far-reaching economic consequences
which will be discussed separately.16
(i) From a first best welfare theoretic standpoint, a state of
labour demand rationing, as it mostly prevailed in Germany
1960-73, can hardly be anything but suboptimal: at any point in
time there remain opportunities for mutually advantageous
contracts between employers and - predominantly foreign -
potential employees, with the contract wage to be fixed somewhere
in the disequilibrium range. However, from a more pragmatic
second-best stance featuring the growth dynamics of the domestic
13) economy, things may look somewhat differently: given a fairly
rigid relative wage structure as it has traditionally prevailed
across regions, economic sectors and industrial branches in
Germany, a less than equilibrium overall wage level may well yield
better conditions than an equilibrium wage level to make market
forces minimize frictions and mitigate structural distortions
introduced by collective bargaining.
This is so for basically four reasons. Firstly, more scope remains
for a demand-induced wedge between the actual wage and the stan-
dard wage set
1by collective bargaining (i.e., wage drift) in a
state of labour shortage than in a state of equilibrium. To the
extent that the wage drift not only recoups the disequilibrium
wedge, but also removes structural distortions through greater
wage differentiation, there is an efficiency gain. In fact, the
sixties were a time of large (temporary) wage drifts which, in
boom periods, helped to overcome severe bottlenecks in selected
. . . . . - 1^> industries and regions.
Secondly, to keep labour motivated despite a relatively low stan-
dard wage, employers will be inclined to be generous in granting
fringe benefits as a partial substitute for pay increases; as
fringe benefits are usually subject to less collective bargaining
regulations than their monetary equivalents, this is likely to add
some flexibility to the labour market. In matters of labour mobil-
ity, this seems to be particularly important: incurring the cost
of moving labour (including the provision of housing) is much more
acceptable to the employer if the wedge between marginal labour
productivity and the wage is not squeezed to zero by collective17
bargaining; to the extent that receiving the monetary equivalent
of this cost as a pay increase is not a feasible alternative, la-
bour will see its opportunity cost of moving reduced so that
structural change can proceed with less friction without any so-
cialisation of mobility costs. No doubt the sixties and early sev-
enties were a peak period in this respect, with employers being
ready to carry moving expenses for labour as a kind of ex post
compensation for wage moderation.
Thirdly, in a state of labour shortage employers have a strong
incentive to take action to search for additional labour supplies
and labour can increasingly rely on them to do so. To the extent
that employers have lower search costs than labour itself - and,
due to their profit motivation and their informational facilities,
this is likely to be the case - one should expect the frictional
costs of structural change to be further reduced. Obviously, the
large-scale recruiting activities of German firms in southern Eu-
rope during-.the boom periods until 1973 a.re a good case in point.
Fourthly, if labour mobility becomes a binding constraint, firms
will be ready to move capital into structurally disadvantaged re-
gions where the labour shortage still has the least dramatic di-
mension. Thus, a general labour shortage may become a (private)
substitute for (public) regional policy to promote backward
regions. In fact, a good deal of the gradual reduction of regional
imbalances in the sixties and early seventies may be due to such
"spill-over effects", with the more rural areas of Lower Saxony,
Rheinland-Pfalz/Saar and Northern Bavaria having a quite
satisfactory performance of employment growth in industry and
services at the expense of North-Rhine-Westfalia; this
equilibrating mechanism might have worked even more powerfully if
there had not been the extremely elastic labour supply from abroad
which was mainly carried into the southern industrialized
, 16) centers.
To sum up, the relatively low labour costs and the consequent la-
bour shortage allowed placing the burden of structural adjustmentIB
mainly on the shoulders of the complementary factors of labour,
i.e. on capital and on entrepreneurship. This in turn led to a
climate of social peace in Germany which was the envy of most oth-
er European countries. For a smooth and frictionless process of
growth and structural change, these were very favourable condi-
tions .
17) (ii) As to the long-term consequences of the labour influx from
abroad, there are basically two distinct opinions, namely
- a positive one: meaning that guest-worker employment broke up
important labour supply bottlenecks and smoothed the process of
structural adjustment, thus improving the growth performance of
the German economy;
structural adjustment and induced misguided investment, thus
19)
- a negative one: meaning that guest-worker employment delayed
structural adjustment and induced
depressing growth in later years.
Both positions will be evaluated below.
Most advocates of the first view confine their argument to an
elaboration of the fact that foreign labour served as a complemen-
tary mass - something like the Marxian industrial reserve army -
which flexibly helped to alleviate the labour shortage whenever
and wherever it showed up. True as this picture appears to be,
it does not yet imply that the influx of foreign labour was neces-
sarily beneficial to long-term growth, since it is not clarified
what would have happened in the absence of an elastic labour sup-
ply. To make a sensible judgement one has to put the historical
record against some relevant counter-factual development.
To do this, let us imagine the German economy of the 1960s as a
stylized two-sector economy, with one sector being traded goods
(called: manufacturing) and the other being non-traded goods
(called: services). Let us further postulate that, due to long-
term income elasticities of product demand and irreversible shifts19
of the international division of labour, this economy moves away
from the secondary into the tertiary sector in terms of both pro-
duction and employment. For the time being, however, the economy
is supposed to be in a process of rapid integration with other
industrialized economies. Due to export-led growth, this economy
reaches its capacity limits in terms of labour and capital. Now,
two polar scenarios are to be analysed, one with a virtually in-
elastic labour supply (the counter-factual) and the other with a
fairly elastic labour supply due to guest-worker immigration (the
factual).
In the counter-factual scenario the labour shortage in manufactur-
ing leads to a real wage push in this sector and - ceteris paribus
- to a movement of labour back from services into manufacturing
until the real wage increase has spread all over the economy.
Clearly, this involves a structural shift against the long-term
trend towards services. This shift will be all the more pronounced
the less service producers are able to raise prices and, thus, to
shift the burden of the labour cost increase onto service consum-
ers; if service demand is fairly price elastic, the structural
backward shift may be quite substantial. In addition, there will
be a tendency in manufacturing to raise labour productivity
through capital deepening so as to keep labour productivity growth
in line with the wage increase.
In the factual scenario the labour shortage in manufacturing is
alleviated through an adequate influx of guest-workers; in the
extreme, no wage increase is needed so that there will be no
structural backward shift from services to manufacturing either.
Following the long-term trend, the German labour force moves into
services (including the government sector) while guest-workers
take their places in manufacturing. As the wage level is kept rel-
atively low, the profitability of investment in manufacturing will
remain high, and so will the level of capital widening investment.
This model may be realistically extended by adding a two-sector
vertical structure of employment; in an extremely simplifiedEO
picture of reality, we distinguish between low qualified workers
(calling them "blue-collar") and highly qualified workers (calling
them "white-collar"), with manufacturing assumed to employ a much
higher proportion of blue-collar workers than services. Long-term
structural change naturally favours higher qualified labour, the
first scenario (the counter-factual) then implies an improvement
of the terms of trade of blue-collar workers which again runs
counter to the long-term trend. The second scenario (the factual)
implies an undisturbed shift of the domestic labour force into
white-collar employment, with foreigners taking over their
blue-collar jobs. By this substitution, vertical mobility for Ger-
mans is achieved through an imported replacement supply of low
qualified labour.
Given these scenarios, an advocate of guest-worker employment may
legitimately conclude that importing foreign labour was the best
feasible way out of a genuine dilemma between the demands of long-
term structural change in favour of services and a medium-term
expansion of manufacturing which was mainly due to the trade lib-
eralisation within the EEC and the undervaluation of the German
currency. The influx of guest-workers allowed the domestic labour
force to continue or even to accelerate its long-term shift into
the service sector and into higher qualified jobs. Closing the
border for foreign labour would have come down to keeping German
workers in the old business of fueling the export engine without
regard to their long-term comparative advantage.
Critical voices on guest-worker employment would reply that this
view underestimates the costs of the factual scenario. Their argu-
ment is threefold: Firstly, the inflow of guest-workers led to a
wrongheaded process of capital widening in manufacturing, since it
is precisely the newly created marginal jobs in mature industries
like iron and steel, metal manufacturing, vehicles, textiles and
clothing which have to be scrapped when competition from less de-
veloped countries (including the home countries of the guest-
workers) increases. As the capital used to provide guest-workers
with jobs is lacking for the purpose of raising the productivity21
level of the domestic labour force through capital deepening, this
amounts to a waste of capital, at least in a long-run perspec-
22)
tive. Secondly, capital widening in manufacturing was particu-
larly unjustified in the late sixties and early seventies since
the German currency was undervalued in terms of production costs
so that a kind of monetary protection wall kept German industry
artificially competitive. And thirdly, the influx of foreign
labour allowed a too rapid expansion of the public sector: with
wages kept low through marginal guest-worker employment in indus-
try, the opportunity cost for government to expand its administra-
tive staff was below its true opportunity cost in terms of the
value of domestic labour to the private sector. As long as wage
increases remained moderate, the ensuing growth of public sector
employment seemed to be tolerable; however, given the high level
of job security in the public sector, a dramatic increase of pub-
lic spending was bound to occur as soon as wage demands picked up. This finally happened in the first half of the seventies, just at
the time when the gr<
onsetting recession.
the time when the growth of tax revenue slowed down due to the
From a long-term growth perspective, all these points are well-
taken. As an absolute yardstick, however, they miss the nature of
the above mentioned dilemma, namely the conflict between the de-
mand of long-term structural change within a world-wide division
of labour and the medium-run boom in manufacturing under the
constraints of a system of fixed exchange rates which conserved a
substantial undervaluation of the German currency. With all do-
mestic resources fully utilized, it was, in fact, hard to avoid
some kind of capital mi sallocation which later could be identified
24-) as such. Grosso modo, the concept of imported flexibility
through guest-worker employment may have been a quite rational
implicit strategy, at least to the extent that the guest-workers
remained a kind of buffer stock so as to flexibly supplement the
German labour force. True, this strategy was likely to induce an
excessive tendency towards capital widening, but, given the
substantial productivity growth in manufacturing all throughoutthe period 1960-73 (on average 5 '/, p.a.), one wonders whether this
claim carries much empirical weight.
Nevertheless, there were at least three major policy failures in
this period which should not be overlooked or unduely discounted;
firstly, a hefty exchange rate adjustment was no doubt overdue in
the lates sixties in view of the divergent paths of monetary
policies and inflation rates. If it had been made in time, it
could have prevented the extreme export boom in the early
seventies and the concomitant influx of foreign labour which on
these grounds must be rated as excessive. In the same vein, in-
vestment in manufacturing at that time was boosted by extremely
optimistic profit expectations based on an undervalued currency.
Secondly, wage policy tracked a very kinky path, with wage modera-
tion prevailing all over the sixties and a virtual wage explosion
happening in the early seventies. Clearly, a much more gradual
ad justment'of labour costs would have contributed to a more stable
investment climate so that, in the early and mid-seventies, the
head-on clash with soaring prices of the factors labour and energy
after a boom period of high capital formation would have been
avoided. However, in this respect, unions were themselves victims
of a mysterious psychology which made them tame in the sixties and
wild in the early seventies.
Thirdly, government growth went too far at a time when the rapid
increase of tax revenue and the general political climate made
authorities confident that an expansion of public services could
be financed. A tighter labour supply constraint could have impeded
the expansion of public employment. On the other hand, strong
ideological forces in all major political parties were pulling
away from classical liberal ideas towards a more comprehensive,
Swedish style welfare state so that - given the usual primacy of
ideology over sound economics - not all that much in terms of
government restraint may have been gained by a rise in labour
costs.E3
To sum up, the overemployment of the sixties and early seventies
was a mixed blessing. It was a blessing in the sense that it al-
lowed regional disparities to be abated, frictional costs of
structural change to be reduced and the German part of the labour
force to be reallocated according to long-term comparative advan-
tages. The blessing was mixed to the extent that it involved a
substantial growth of government and a boom in manufacturing which
was to fade away as soon as factor prices and the exchange rate
were adjusted and the dynamics of European integration came to an
end. However, looking back from today's vintage point after twelve
years of growth slack and chronic unemployment, one may be tempted
to say that a mixed blessing of this kind is better than no
blessing at all.Notes
Own calculation from "The Economist", Economic Statistics 1900-
1983, Table G.6. , p. 9, which is based on the data provided by
Mitchell <1980). Until 1925, Mitchell (1980) measures the unem-
ployment rate in Germany as the share of union members who were
unemployed.
Apart from the unemployment rate, the inflow of foreign workers
gives a clue to the state of the labour market in the first dec-
ade of this century. In June 1907, the share of foreign workers
in total employment was 3.9 '/.. As 1907 was a boom year and June
a seasonal peak month, one may dare to conclude that the share
of foreign workers did not exceed something like <+ V, most of the
time before World War I. This is a remarkably high level which
does point to some acute labour shortage; still then, it is a
far cry from the levels reached in the late sixties and early
seventies which were well above 10 */.. For details, see Merx
( 1967), pp. 89 ff.
3)
Kuhl (1970) argues that, relative to earlier periods, the vacan-
cy statistics of the late sixties may be biased upwards for a
variety of reasons, of which the most important one is the ris-
ing share of foreign workers in the labour force. Economically
reinterpreted, his argument runs as follows: As the share of the
labour force seeking employment in Germany through the interme-
diation of public labour offices is higher among foreigners than
among Germans, public offices become particularly attractive
brokers to employers in times when additional labour is mostly
forthcoming through the inflow and the fluctuation of foreign-
ers; hence the inclination of employers to notify vacancies to
the labour office may rise in these times which - ceteris pari-
bus - shows up in a higher frictional base of vacancies and thus
a higher vacancy rate. - This argument is correct, but its em-
pirical relevance remains unclear. Given the neatly inverse
movements of the unemployment rate and the (possibly biased)
vacancy rate, it is unlikely to carry much weight.
^ See e.g. Jackman &> Roper (1986).
On the elasticity of the domestic labour supply, see the annual
reports of the Council of Economic Experts <Sachverstandigen-
rat), 1964 ff. (chapters on supply constraints).
As no proper data on the sectoral distribution of foreign labour
is available for the years 1960 and 1973, the period had to be
restricted to the years 1961-72.
7>See Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, 1972/73, p. 15, Table 9. Within
manufacturing, there were also significant differences between
industries, with some branches having a share of foreignersclose to 20 •/. (such as textiles and clothing). Viewed as a
whole, however, the intra-sectoral differences were clearly less
dramatic than the inter-sectoral ones.
8 )
For details about unemployment in the 1950s, see Paque (1987).
9)
For technical details of this index, see Jackman & Roper (1987).
Economically, the index can be interpreted as the share of the
unemployed who would have to move to another region to accom-
plish regional balance (defined as an equal ratio of unemployed
and vacancies across regions).
See Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, 1972/73, p. 22. More detailed
statistics show that the guest-workers were heavily concentrated
in metropolitan areas and that, among these, more so in the
southern than in the northern ones (see Bundesanstalt fur
Arbeit, 1972/73, pp. 25 ff.).
See Council of Economic Experts (Sachverstandigenrat), Jahres-
gutachten 1987/88, p. 110 f. The ratio of profits to revenue in
the private sector lay in the range of 6.1-9.5 */. depending on
the state of the business cycle; these were levels which have so
far not been reached again after 1969. For details see Council




See Council of Economic Experts (Sachverstandigenrat), Jahres-
gutachten 1987/88, p. 110 f. Within the five years from 1970-75,
the ratio of profits to revenue in the private sector declined
from levels above 6 '/, to 3.6 */.. See Council of Economic Experts
(Sachverstandigenrat), Jahresgutachten 1987/88, p. 108.
13)
The following line of reasoning owes much to arguments made by
Professor Herbert Giersch in private conversations with the
author.
1^)
See Council of Economic Experts (Sachverstandigenrat), Annual
Reports l<?b<+ ff., section on productive capacity and production.
In its annual report 1965 (Ch. <+, Sec. Ill, pp. 153 f f. ) the
Council of Economic Experts (Sachverstandigenrat) provides some
empirical evidence on the reduction of inter-state disparities
of income levels in the early sixties. The Council explicitly
argues that private firms were increasingly inclined to make
investments in backward regions instead of industrial centers.
How far such a process of diffusion of a labour shortage can go
in the absence of substantial immigration has recently been
shown in New England. After the most successful restructuring of
the economy of New England's heartland (i.e., Massachusetts,
Connecticut, southern New Hampshire and Rhode Island) away from£6
declining textiles to modern service and high tech industries,
an extreme labour shortage arose in and around the industrial
and service centers; as a consequence, capital began to move up
into the rural hinterland (northern New Hampshire, Vermont,
Maine), thus spreading the labour shortage into the remotest and
previously most depressed regions of the American northeast. See
"The Economist", August B, 1987, New England Survey, p. IE.
17)
In the sixties and early seventies, the short-run buffer stock
effects of the guest-worker movements were discussed as much as
their long-term effects. As this paper focuses on long-run de-
velopments, we do not enquire into this matter. For a good sum-
mary treatment, see Merx (197E), Ch. IV, pp. 108 ff.
18)
See Kleemann (1965), p. 8E f; Schmahl (1971), p. 6E; Merx
(197S), p. 14.
19>See Harms (1966), pp. S77 ff.; Rustow (1966), pp. 35 ff.;
Fohl (1967), pp. 119 ff. and, with a strong emphasis on struc-
tural change, Schatz (1974), pp. S05 ff. The literature of the
mid-sixties contains additional arguments against guest-worker
employment (e.g., the need for additional infra-structure
investment, the large transfers of income to the home country,
etc.). As these arguments have no substantial bearing on matters
of economic growth, we will not consider them here. For a sum-
mary statement see Merx (197S), Ch. I.
See above all the elaborate study by Merx (197S), Ch. II and
III •
El )
The empirical results presented by Merx (197S), Ch. 11 on for-
eign labour employment clearly point to strong replacement ef-
fects between Germans and foreigners, both horizontally across
sectors and vertically across employment status.
EE)
See Schatz (1974), pp. E05 ff. He also shows that among in-
dustries the share of guest-worker employment in 1969 was some-
what negatively correlated with human capital intensity, i.e.,
on average, foreigners moved more into branches where one should
not expect Germany to have a long-run comparative advantage. See
Schatz (1974), p. S09.
23)See again Schatz (1974), p. S15.
£4)
This term is due to Professor Herbert Giersch.27
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